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Abstract 
The purpose of a risk assessment is to make a decision whether the risk of a given situation is 
acceptable, and, if not, how we can reduce it to a tolerable level. For many cases, this can be done 
in a semi-quantitative fashion. For more complex or problematic cases a quantitative approach is 
required. Anybody who has been involved in such a study is aware of the difficulties and pitfalls. 
Despite proven software many choices of parameters must be made and many uncertainties 
remain. The thoroughness of the study can make quite a difference in the result. Independently, 
analysts can arrive at results that differ orders of magnitude, especially if uncertainties are not 
included. Because for important decisions on capital projects there are always proponents and 
opponents, there is often a tense situation in which conflict is looming.  
The paper will first briefly review a standard procedure introduced for safety cases on 
products that must provide more or less a guarantee that the risk of use is below a certain value. 
Next will be the various approaches how to deal with uncertainties in a quantitative risk assessment 
and the follow-on decision process. Over the last few years several new developments have been 
made to achieve, to a certain extent, a hold on so-called deep uncertainty. Expert elicitation and its 
limitations is another aspect. The paper will be concluded with some practical recommendations. 
Keywords: Risk assessment, uncertainty, trustworthiness, decision making 
1. Introduction 
Process safety involving hazardous materials can be evaluated only by determining remaining 
risk. As we all have the task to do the utmost to prevent the nasty surprise of a major accident, we 
must perform risk assessments one way or another. Now, in most cases we can rely on situations 
we know, and we can estimate risk magnitudes at least in ranges. In case there are quite a few risk 
sources around, with the aid of a risk matrix we can perform a semi-quantitative assessment on a 
comparative or even an order of magnitude basis, in which we can visually overlook and categorize 
the risk situation. However, difficulty arises when the potential consequences can be catastrophic, 
costly risk reduction becomes an issue, and the case must be considered on a quantitative basis, a 
quantitative risk assessment or QRA, using distributions instead of only ranges for consequence 
and frequency or probability of occurrence. Of course, in such cases the probability of occurrence 
will generally be very low. This constitutes the typical rare event prediction problem. Such cases 
have given rise to endless debates and are the topic of many scientific papers, because experimental 
validation of high impact, low probability risk is virtually impossible. The final result of an 
assessment depends strongly on assumptions and the data used. Depending on what is judged 
reasonable as starting material, different assessors with different background knowledge can come 
to end results that in a quantitative sense can differ by orders of magnitude especially if uncertainty 
is not properly assessed. Regretfully, the practice to discuss uncertainties in studies and to present 
ranges of inaccuracy is essential but still uncommon.  
Due to risk assessment results afflicted with uncertainty, parties with opposing interests have 
been fighting in many forums to get a project accepted or not, and often when it gets into the public 
arena such project becomes a political bone of contention. As Aven and Zio [1] note: “The 
disguised subjectivity of risk assessments is potentially dangerous and open to abuse if it is not 
recognized.” And also: “Precise numbers are used as a facade to cover up what are often political 
decisions”. The work procedure for a risk assessment sounds easy but the execution is usually 
rather problematic and one can easily loose trust in the result. Predicting risk in a given situation 
with many hazards present and with the many possibilities in which a scenario can conditionally 
develop, is in a physical sense, regarding the range of possible consequences, not that simple but 
in probabilities almost impossible. Yet, we are depending on assessments to support optimum 
decision making and weighing of effort against cost. And also, it is not just a specific problem of 
process safety. Risk management in general, whether it is on project planning and execution, 
financial or business, all face the same problem. We want to look into the future, but predictive 
tools are fallible and the prediction results are helpful but uncertain. 
In fact, the problem has two sides: one side is the thoroughness of QRA treatment and 
assessment of uncertainty, and the other is what can we do to validate a result and how much can 
the result of an analyst team, given their capabilities, be trusted.  
In this paper, we shall look at these aspects, and we shall start in Section 2 with an extreme, 
but for certain manufacturers serious case in which a team or company is asked to give more or 
less a guarantee on the frequency of a rare event prediction result. This is related to a product of 
which the user can be killed in the event. In Section 3 we shall briefly review some ways to deal 
with uncertainty in process risk. In Section 4 before reaching a conclusion, we shall indicate in 
what directions we can improve and validate, and we will discuss what can be done to obtain 
greater confidence in view of decision making under uncertainty and policy developing.  
2. The Safety Case trustworthiness 
First the designation “Safety case”: In the U.S. it is used often as an equivalent to ‘Risk assess-
ment’, but that is not fully right. A ‘safety case’ is quite strict following the definition in the U.K. 
Defence Standard (DS 00-56) [2] as ‘‘a structured argument, supported by a body of evidence that 
provides a compelling, comprehensible, and valid case that a system is acceptably safe for a given 
application in a given operating environment”. Although the statement is entirely qualitative, the 
target is in most cases quantitative, and the choice of words does not leave any doubt that it is a 
serious and stringent requirement to satisfy. As a term, ‘safety case’ became known to indicate a 
risk assessment and a report that should convince the competent authorities in the countries around 
the North Sea that the offshore operation is safe. In the U.K., according to HSE, The Health and 
Safety Executive, the Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 (SCR05) [3] aim to 
reduce the risks from major accident hazards to the health and safety of the workforce employed 
on offshore installations and in connected activities. The regulations implement the main 
recommendations of Lord Cullen's Report of the Public Inquiry into the 1988 Piper Alpha Disaster. 
However, the term also became more generally applied, even according to the meaning the defense 
standard intends. This is to give products that in case of failure could result in death of the user or 
in some type of disaster, confidence that use of the product is safe, e.g., regarding aircraft, 
pacemaker, safety-critical instrumentation and software, et cetera. The above mentioned standard 
DS 00-56 requires evidence based assuring arguments and the confidence in a claim that the system 
is acceptably safe. So, if the claim is that the pacemaker will have a maximum failure rate of 10-
5/yr, the manufacturing company must provide persuading evidence for this claim.  
Sujan et al. [4] in connection to the question whether health care should adopt the concept of 
the safety case, provide more extensive background and development of the safety case and of the 
various industry branches in the U.K., where it has become practice. Meanwhile, the concept has 
become in use also at the U.S. Department of Defense for certain projects and at NASA. 
 
Figure 1. Example of Goal Structuring Notation (GSN Community [5]) for a safety case of a 
SIS control system. Rectangular means Goal, G; a circle is a Solution, Sn; a rhomb is a Strategy, 
S, linking lower goals to a higher one, and connected to an oval being either an oval Assumption, 
A, or Justification, J; finally, the tank like balloons are Comments, C. 
The assurance process is goal based: It sets requirements but does not state how to fulfill these 
requirements. The University of York, U.K., with among others, Tim Kelly, is an important player 
in developing the assurance concept and in organizing a community of interested industry 
members. In 2011 the GSN Community [5] proposed the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) 
Standard as a means to underpin assurance arguments. The Standard states: “GSN is a graphical 
argumentation notation that can be used to document explicitly the individual elements of any 
argument (claims, evidence and contextual information)”. The definition of an assurance is given 
as: “A reasoned and compelling argument, supported by a body of evidence, that a system, service 
or organisation will operate as intended for a defined application in a defined environment”. 
Further an argument is defined as: “a connected series of claims intended to establish an overall 
claim”. The argumented claim can be qualitative or quantitative and is deemed true or false. An 
example of a GSN graphical structure related to a Safety Instrumented System is given in Figure 
1. The standardized graphical structure serves the communication among the different 
stakeholders. There is much more to GSN than described here, but Figure 1 gives an impression. 
Quite a few companies have adopted GSN.  
A distinction is made between a safety argument and a confidence argument, which is made 
to back the safety argument. The former spells out the asserted arguments for reducing the risk to 
the residual risk level, while the latter presents the reasons why one can have confidence in that 
result. For the safety argument, the ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable) within the 
acceptable range criterion requirements can be used. In a report by Nair et al. [6] an approach is 
described of what is called evidential reasoning to assess the confidence one can achieve in the 
safety argument. This latter concept is why we mention this here, because that is what should 
produce or increase credibility and trustworthiness. The principle is building a hierarchy of 
attributes, which depending on importance can be weighted, while the base level of attributes is 
assessed by an expert on, e.g., a 5-point Likert-scale. By introducing subjective probability as a 
mathematically less strict belief function, an expert can express his/her uncertainty by attributing 
a belief value of say 25% to the highest scale “excellent” and 75% to “good”. The beliefs need not 
sum to 100%, and if the assessor has no knowledge about an attribute, zero is submitted. The belief 
function is the core of the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence to be further explained in Section 
3. A number of rules have been developed to assimilate the attributes. Nair et al. [6] developed a 
software tool (EviCA = Evidence Confidence Assessor) for guiding a user and aggregating the 
various sub-claims in a coherent final assertion.  
The structure of attributes built for the confidence argument makes a main distinction between 
trustworthiness and appropriateness. Trustworthiness is subdivided into Personnel, 
Process/Techniques, Tool Integrity, Content Compliance, Evidence Past, and a User-Defined 
Trustworthiness Factor. Personnel is further subdivided into Past Knowledge, Competency, 
Independence, Domain Experience, and User-Defined Personnel Factors; Processes/Techniques 
into Past Use, Definition, Peer Review, and User-Defined Processes/Techniques Factor; Tool 
Integrity into Bound Qualification, Standard Qualification, and User-Defined Tool Factor; Content 
Compliance into Scope, Expected structure, and User-Defined Content Compliance Factor. Then, 
the other top factor Appropriateness is sub-divided into Scope, Expected Structure, and User-
Defined Content Compliance Factor. The meaning of these factors is explained in the report of 
Nair et al. [6], and shown in GSN graphs. To mention all that here is to give an impression of the 
thoroughness of the assessment. The report describes the use of a software tool and some examples.  
Besides the mentioned method of Evidential Reasoning there are quite a few other methods 
in use for the same purpose. In a very interesting and elaborate paper by Graydon and Holloway 
[7], an overview of all the techniques in use is presented and a test performed to investigate whether 
a technique can yield a positive assessment of a case in which it would not have been justified. 
Twelve different teams practicing safety case assurance were identified. From these, five applied 
Bayesian networks, six the related methods of Dempster–Shafer Theory, Jøsang’s Opinion 
Triangle, or Evidential Reasoning, and one based on simple weighting, proposed by Yamamoto.  
In case of the Bayesian Belief networks (BBN), various attributes are represented by network 
nodes and the assimilation by edge connections between nodes producing a cause-effect network 
structure. The parent base nodes are fed the attribute subjective belief probabilities, upon which 
the top leaf node produces the confidence degree. However, all five teams applying BBN structure 
of the network calculated the node probability value differently.  
Dempster-Shafer theory not only measures the strength of a belief probability but also the 
plausibility. Jøsang’s Opinion Triangle discerns three dimensions: belief, disbelief, and 
uncertainty, and Evidential Reasoning has been briefly explained above and functions according 
to the Dempster-Shafer theory. Analysts following Yamamoto rate GSN attributes on a five-point 
Likert scale from strongly unsatisfied to strongly satisfied and assess the overall confidence in the 
claim by means of weighted averages. 
Graydon and Holloway [7] analyzed all 12 methods in detail and applied on each a counter-
example inspired by the example used by the authors describing the assurance technique. In all 
cases a counterexample could be identified in which the technique’s output was implausible, and 
hence, the technique proved to be not fully trustworthy. Detailed results can be found in a NASA 
report (Graydon and Holloway [8]). This result does not mean that the techniques used are wrong, 
but as Graydon and Holloway concluded the techniques are imperfect. It only shows how difficult 
it is to prove decisively an assessment result of the occurrence probability of a rare event to be 
below a certain low value. Instead, we should focus on estimating the credibility of an occurrence 
probability less than a selected acceptably low value. 
3. Treatment of process and plant risk uncertainty 
Over the years much has been learned on risk assessment and how to treat uncertainty, but 
relatively little of the new learning has become common practice. This year a special issue of the 
journal of Safety Science on the topic of Risk Analysis Validation and Trust in Risk Management 
will appear. The present authors contributed an article entitled: “Risk assessment: What is it worth? 
Shall we just do away with it, or can it do a better job?” (Pasman, Rogers, Mannan [9]). Of course, 
the answer to the rhetoric question is “yes”, but it takes an effort. We shall briefly summarize the 
findings.  
First, a positive note about consequence analysis, which has been much improved in methods 
and performed within widened applications. Yet, there is still uncertainty. MKOPSC accomplished 
much learning through fundamental work in outflow and boiling of cryogenics, such as LNG, but 
prediction of evaporation rate in a given case is still not a clear-cut task. A few other examples: 
calculation of dispersion of cloud by means of different 3-D computational fluid dynamics models 
gave for a number of aspects an improvement over previous integral models, but for good 
confidence the spread in results for a given case obtained using different codes is still too large. 
The low wind speed condition, in which most damage effect is possible, requires more attention. 
Although more and more is known about the BLEVE phenomenon, we would like to know more 
about the details of time and effect distribution of this physical explosion behavior, also in view 
of decision making during emergency response action. There has been much progress made in 
knowledge about vapor cloud explosion, and now it is understood that given certain conditions a 
large flammable cloud can detonate; further development of models is required. Finally, the 
number of probit relations on various effect phenomena describing probability of extent of damage 
is still growing and expanding also with respect to domino effects. Unfortunately, including 
uncertainty ranges in results is also in consequence analysis still uncommon. 
However, the most serious problems in risk assessment are posed by hazard identification, 
scenario definition, and failure rate data. On invitation and in cooperation with Prof. Cameron 
and colleagues in Australia a review has been written about problems and perspectives regarding 
HAZID methods (Cameron et al. [10]). Due to the many possibilities something can go wrong, 
scenario completeness for a given plant is not easy to achieve and certainly not the assurance the 
scenarios identified are complete. But, adoption of a system approach and use of computerization 
are the way to achieve a more comprehensive hazard identification and possible scenarios for a 
socio-technical system representing an operational plant and its organization.  
Failure rate uncertainty is an old problem. Although some data bases are available, applicable 
data are scarce and conditions of failure badly defined, so that the well-developed framework of 
equations describing availability cannot be used to its full potential. Lack of willingness out of fear 
to public exposure and legal consequence hinders cooperation with respect to failure rate data and 
impedes progress. Risk assessment pioneers and proposers of the triplets of risk analysis: scenario 
- failure frequency – consequence (𝑠, , 𝑥), Kaplan and Garrick [11], recognized already in 1981 
the uncertainty problem, and launched the probability density of frequency concept. If data are 
collected on the failure frequency of an equipment one can build a distribution 𝑝() and find an 
average, median, and variance. Data are scarce, especially when it concerns a particular brand and 
type of equipment. In fact, one can apply this reasoning also on scenario and consequence. Kaplan 
and Garrick therefore proposed the Bayes theorem stating that prior distribution multiplied by a 
likelihood distribution of new evidence while normalizing the product to a maximum probability 
of unity, yields a posterior distribution. Bayes theorem allows inclusion of data from similar 
equipment and plants, hence not strictly data from the same population. The uncertainty the Bayes 
model aggregates will be expressed again in the variance and shape of the posterior. Now, more 
than three decades later we are teaching and applying the principle, but its use in actual practice of 
process safety is still very reluctant, yet it is needed now more than ever. An example how it works, 
is given in the Appendix.  
For the rare event frequency, Kaplan and Garrick [11], already in 1981 much advanced in 
thinking, mentioned the multiple-stage use of the Bayes theorem, formally called Hierarchical 
Bayesian Analysis (HBA). Suppose following a certain initiating event (IE), one can notice an 
alert, or barrier functioning, or a failure that could have been developed to a serious accident, but 
thanks to safeguarding or another mechanism the accident didn’t materialize. Suppose further, that 
as indicators one can record over a certain period of, e.g., 20-30 years the number of these 
precursors and their corresponding end states. If both indicators and end-states are specific for the 
IE, these data can be used for rare event frequency prediction. The data can be even from the sector 
as a whole instead of own plant only. In such case an event tree representing the possible physics 
of the phenomena should be developed. This tree branching out following a particular IE links the 
sequence of successive at the branch points observable events in the tree (e.g., vibration, corrective 
maintenance, smoke, alarm), to counted precursor end states of damage (e.g., no damage, trip, 
small leak, large leak and emergency shutdown, fire, disastrous explosion), which also can be 
expressed in monetary loss values. The observed number of end state occurrences of each type 𝑖, 
𝑛𝑖 in a given time, 𝑡 with an average occurrence rate estimator, 𝑛𝑖/𝑡 = 𝑖 can be modeled, e.g., as 
a Poisson distribution, which is an exponential function: 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑖𝑡){(𝑖𝑡)
𝑛𝑖/𝑛𝑖!}. Each type 𝑖 will 
have a different but related sector source. The source-to-source variability for 𝑖 is modeled in the 
first stage of a two-stage HBN with an aggregated Poisson likelihood for 𝑖 and a prior gamma 
distribution, (𝑖|𝐸) =  ∬ 1 (𝑖|𝐸,, )3(,  |𝐸)dd  conjugate to Poisson, i.e. mathema-
tically compatible and producing a posterior gamma distribution. In this equation  and  for the 
second stage of the HBN are so-called hyper-parameters assumed to be independent. Given as a 
worst case of no prior information on  and  at all, a uniform distribution representing an 
uninformative hyperprior, but preferably when any information is available with an informative 
hyperprior, for example an expert estimate, the theorem will produce a posterior in  and .  
This posterior will be based too on the evidence of 𝑛 and 𝑡, which instead of fixed values are 
now functions of  and . In the second step for a particular precursor type a predictive density 
for 𝑖 is derived as (𝑖|𝐸) =  ∬ 1 (𝑖|𝐸,, )3(,  |𝐸)dd, in which  is a gamma 
probability distribution, and 𝐸 is evidence. The solutions to the equations are obtained by 
WinBUGS software based on the Markov-Chain Monte-Carlo technique. The result takes account 
of the variability among sources, and by taking data of a specific plant in the sector via a 
conventional Bayesian update the plant specific 𝑖,𝑠𝑝 are found. Also, the aggregate of the posterior 
means, the 𝑖,𝑠𝑝, for each tree sequence yields the IE frequency, while the ratios resolve the branch 
probabilities of the event tree. Given later new evidence, the Bayes theorem can further update the 
rate. If, as usual the case, the same end-state, e.g., a trip, can be reached via different branches of 
the tree a different route has to be followed. On demand the top events are binomial success or 
failure. Their numbers can be derived from the end state ones, while IE is the sum of all numbers. 
Then, the estimator is ?̂?𝑗 = 𝑛𝑗/𝑛𝐼𝐸. For binomial distributed variables, the hyper-parameters are 
assumed to be beta-distributed, where beta is conjugate to binomial. The further calculation 
proceeds similarly to the above. The event tree can also be modeled as a Bayesian network. The 
principle has been demonstrated the last few years in a few papers (Yang et al. [12] and [13]; 
Khakzad et al. [14]), which line out further possibilities and applications. 
Uncertainties with respect to possible scenarios, and consequence estimates also deserve 
much attention. If a bowtie is constructed, and even better a Bayesian network using a bowtie as a 
starting point, and input parameter uncertainties are specified, these uncertainties will be 
propagated throughout the network, and the effect on the spread of the risk result can be 
determined. The uncertainties can be specified either, e.g., as variance of truncated normal 
distribution of an input parameter or as a uniform or flat distribution, indicating only an expected 
interval. In fact, uncertainty analysis can be conducted also as sensitivity analysis by finding out 
which variables, parameters, and uncertainties have the largest effect on the final result. 
A considerable number of major accidents occurred according to scenarios that had been 
excluded before as improbable. Usually it is cost of measures that drives the decision and the large 
uncertainty margin of the probability of occurrence. Yet, the larger the potential consequence, the 
lower a failure event probability or frequency of occurrence should be. Nuclear power plants are 
the best-known example. The Fukushima board was warned and knew that in case of high tsunami, 
the reactors would be threatened. So, how can we make good decisions in risk management, or 
rather how to make optimum decisions under uncertainty? Much has been written about the topic 
and methods have been proposed in relation to economics and investment decision. More 
specifically relevant to industrial risk there are rigorous methods applying probabilities, others 
based on approximate reasoning, and finally using only expert knowledge. In all, background 
knowledge and belief play a role. Most rigorous is the Bayesian approach just mentioned, which 
can also make use of subjective probability as input. The latter is the kind of probability one would 
quote when asked how likely it will rain tomorrow. The Bayes model is not biased by preferences, 
and it analyzes evidence from events but not the events themselves. Bayes is the most coherent 
and effective method to analyze information about events, propagate the uncertainties, and support 
evidence based reasoning and decisions with estimated uncertainties. If cost factors are introduced 
in a Bayesian network, the annual average expected loss can be calculated and be part of business 
decision-making. (Pasman and Rogers [15]). 
Less rigorous but still close to Bayesian belief functionality and known for managing 
uncertainty is the Dempster-Shafer method. In fact, the Evidential Reasoning described in Section 
2 is an example of it (Zeng et al. [16]; Nair et al. [6]). The method is about degrees of belief and 
subjective probability and as a method of approximate reasoning that is suited in cases of 
conflicting or confusing evidence when the rigorous Bayesian method does not offer a solution. 
Shafer’s 1976 contribution [17] is to distinguish your subjective probability estimate of how 
reliable an expert is in general, and his/her degree of belief whether a certain event or issue occurs. 
The degree of belief the event/issue does not take place, can be a value smaller than the difference 
of occurrence probability, and can even be set to be zero, meaning only that the expert did not have 
a reason why the event or issue should not occur. The gap between 1 and the sum of both 
probabilities for occur & not occur, is called ignorance, which discerns it from probability theory 
where it is always 0. Occurrence plausibility is 1 minus belief of non-occurrence. Degree of belief 
in evidence is analogous to mass, 𝑚 assigned to probability. Now, there could be related but 
independent evidence in the environment, e.g., amplifying what the expert states, or there is 
another independent expert statement, who even in part may contradict that of the first one. 
Dempster’s 1968 combination rule [18] enables fusing belief functions, e.g., 𝑚1.and 𝑚2, and is 
written as follows: 
𝑚1 ⊕ 𝑚2(𝑍) = (
1
𝐾
) ∑ 𝑚1(𝑋)𝑚2(𝑌);      𝐾 = 1 −  ∑ 𝑚1(𝑋)𝑚2(𝑌)
𝑋⋂𝑌=∅𝑋⋂𝑌=𝑍
 
𝑋⋂𝑌 = 𝑍 includes all those elements that 𝑋 and 𝑌 have in common, while ⊕ means summing 
the products of intersecting terms at the right side of the equation. 𝐾 is a normalization factor and 
has the value 1 for the example that follows below. The new mass represents consensus as it 
consists of the agreement parts of the inputs and not the disagreement ones. A simple example is 
the following. A question is whether in a given plant situation a critical event can occur or not. An 
expert, thought to be highly reliable, estimates it as possible with 75% chance. A second expert, 
also renowned, considering modernization estimates the possibility only 30%. The combination 
rule for Expert 1 OR Expert 2 assuming independence of experts produces 1 - (1 - 0.75)(1 - 0.30) 
= 0.83 degree of support that the event is possible (unity minus the product of the non-assigned 
beliefs of the two experts, that is what they have in common, yields new belief). It can be 
performed with three elements or more, e.g., there had been an accident 20 year ago or not, and 
did the expert know that, but it quickly becomes complicated to formulate the problem correctly. 
In any case, the Dempster-Shafer method can also be used to generate imprecise data, for example, 
for a fault tree analysis (Curcurù et al. [19]). 
Several other methods have been proposed always with inputs from experts to at least obtain 
an expectation. Zadeh’s Fuzzy logic, on which there exists a wealth of literature, with its 
membership functions has been used extensively, but it has the fundamental shortcoming that in 
the last step, the defuzzification to obtain a so-called crisp value, all uncertainty information is 
deleted and an unjustified and illusory feel of certainty can arise. The Analytic Hierarchy Process, 
also much in use, is based on preferences and is not suitable for engineering decision making. 
Hazelrigg [20] explains the reasons.  
Expert elicitation is not a simple matter, and there has been quite some discussion. Bolger and 
Rowe [21] discussed with respect to the classical method, the best way “to calibrate” the experts, 
the problems of unreliability, and the aggregation of expert opinion by weighting, called 
mathematical aggregation, and alternatively behavioral aggregation. In the latter, experts in a 
group with a facilitator attempt in rounds of deliberation and voting to move toward and come to 
a consensus. Cooke [22] with a long-time experience in expert elicitation and Bayesian statistical 
result treatment (see Pasman, Rogers [23]), wrote a critique on the Bolger and Rowe paper. The 
focus of the critique is on the calibration and type of weighting: equal weighting or differential, 
also called performance weighting, of which Cooke is a proponent. (In their response, Bolger and 
Rowe [24] stress that it had been their intention to discuss the advantage of behavioral aggregation 
over equal weighting and not to discuss performance weighting!)  
Petri net is attractive for random, safety critical timing problems, but it is rather effort 
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Figure 2. Taxonomy of uncertainties according to Cox [25] after an original by Walker et al. 
[26] 
When knowledge is lacking (epistemic) deep uncertainty is most problematic. Cox [25] 
provides guidance with the scheme given in Figure 2. First, a taxonomy of degrees of uncertainty 
and lack of knowledge makes clearer where deep uncertainty starts. If in the setting of a Level 1 
risk management, decisions must be made on alternative risk reducing measures, what Cox calls 
acts, the usual approach is to weigh consequences in (dis-)utility terms against acts, which in the 
end will mean investment. This is called the Subjective Expected Utility, or SEU decision theory. 
The model of the system is defined and validated. In the decision, probability, e.g., due to 
parameter value uncertainty is taken into account besides consequences, act options, and the utility. 
This approach will still work in case of Level 2 uncertainty. 
Table 1. Ten methods for decision making under uncertainty after Cox [25]. From top to bottom 
methods become more rigorous due to increasing uncertainty in depth. 
Method Model generation Optimization/Adaptation Combination 
Expected utility/SEU theory One model specified 
Maximize expected utility (over 
all acts in the choice set, A) 
None 
Multiple priors, models, or 
scenarios; robust control, 
robust decisions 
Identify multiple priors (or 
models, or scenarios, etc.) 
e.g., all models close to a 
reference model (based on 
relative entropy) 
Maximize the return from the 
worst-case model in the 
uncertainty set 
Penalize alternative models 
based on their 
dissimilarity to a 
reference model 
Robust optimization 
Use decisionmaker's risk 
attitude, represented by a 
coherent risk measure, to 
define the uncertainty set 
Optimize objective function 
while satisfying constraints, 




Use multiple predictive (e.g., 
forecasting) models 
None 
Simple average or weighted 
majority 
Resampling 
Create many random subsets 
of original data and fit a 
model to each 
Fit models using standard (e.g., 
least squares, maximum 
likelihood) statistical criteria 
Create empirical distribution 
of estimates 
Adaptive boosting (Adaboost) 
Iteratively update training data 
set and fit new model 
Reweight past models based on 
predictive accuracy 
Use weights to combine 
models 
Bayesian model averaging 
(BMA) 
Include all models that are 
consistent with data based 
on likelihood 
Condition model probabilities on 
data 
Weight models by their 
estimated probabilities 
Low-regret online decisions 
Set of experts, models, 
scenarios, etc. is given, 
{M1, M2,…., Mn} 
Reduce weights of models that 
make mistakes 
Weighted majority or 
selection probability 
Reinforcement learning (RL) 
for MDPPs: UCRL2 
Uncertainty set consists of 
confidence region around 
empirical values 
Approximately solve Bellman 
equations1) for most optimistic 
model in uncertainty set to 
determine next policy 
Update from episode to 
episode based on new 
data 
Model-free reinforcement 
learning (RL) for MDPs: 
SARA 
No model used (model-free 
learning) 
Approximately solve Bellman 
equations1) for unknown 
model 
Update value estimates & 
policies based on new 
data 
1) Bellman dynamic programming equation is optimization by dynamic programming for solving a complex 
problem by breaking it down into a collection of simpler subproblems and storing solutions. 
 
However, if model uncertainties arise, Cox identified obstacles that will hamper applying 
SEU. Model and model parameter uncertainty will cause uncertainty about what acts are best, 
because consequences, scenario probabilities, utility parameter values, and preferences are 
uncertain. For these cases of deep uncertainty Cox discusses ten tools, which may lead to better 
understanding and decision making even when the risk model is uncertain. The ten tools of so-
called robust risk analysis are summarized in a table, here reproduced as Table 1, and from the top 
towards the bottom suited for Level 1 to Level 4 uncertainty. Robust risk analysis means that based 
on available knowledge and data a number of models/scenarios is generated, which shall be 
improved and optimized as far as possible and then in some way combined. Such a combination 
can be performed according to a combination rule: weighting or voting. In Cox [25] each method 




Figure 3. KUUUB factor example adapted from Fenton and Neil [27]. 
Not the same as the Bayesian model mentioned in Table 1 but related, is the Bayesian network 
method based on estimates of ‘knowns’ and more or less ‘unknowns’, called the KUUUB factor 
described by Fenton and Neil [27], see Figure 3. KUUUB is an acronym for Known-Unknown, 
Unknown-Unknown, and Bias. An adapted example is a company, in which the financial losses 
due to undesired risk events of an activity A for the current year are not precisely known yet, but 
are estimated as a truncated normal distribution with mean 20 and variance 10. It is asked to make 
an estimate for next year’s budget in view of two new activities, B and C. Hence, there are three 
risk scenarios, called Key Risk Indicators (KRIs). These are expressed as probability of degrees of 
improvement or of degradation trend on a 7-point scale. KRI A is the known product line with 
existing risk (weight 2.5); KRI B is an identical line manufacturing a new product with different 
hazardous properties (weight 1.8) and KRI C is a new high hazard plant (weight 1.0). The 
distribution of KRI C is conditional on the precursor indicators of a previous test run. By 
multiplying the weighted mean distribution estimate, 𝐸, of the three KRI trend scenarios with a 
Delta distribution, , a KUUUB adjusted estimate is obtained: 𝐾𝐵 =   ∙ 𝐸.  Delta parameter-
values expressing degrees of uncertainty are conditional on each trend qualification according to 
Table 2. The parameters are selected based on experienced expert judgment. The crux is that Delta 
is partitioned per trend qualification from major improvement to major degradation. Each partition 
is modeled as a truncated normal distribution (TND) with mean, variance, upper and lower bound. 
If there is no change the  -value collapses to unity (or zero for variance). The compound Delta 
emerges as a distribution as shown in Figure 3.  
Table 2. Delta truncated normal distribution (TND) parameter values conditional on trends  
Trends  \  TND 
parameters: Mean Variance Lower Upper 
Major improvement 0.1 0.2 0.1 1 
Substantial improvement 0.5 0.1 0.1 1 
Improvement  0.7 0.1 0.1 1 
No change  1 0 1 1 
Degradation  2 4 1 10 
Substantial degradation 5 4 1 10 
Major 
degradation  8 2 1 10 
 
The KUUUB adjusted projected loss distribution is less steep than the current losses, because 
due to uncertain degradation significant probability density mass is drawn into a long uncertainty 
tail increasing probability of unexpected upsets and greater losses! The indicator node represents 
aggregated indicators of interdependent socio-technical characteristics, such as emergent behavior 
and organization resilience, which correspond to changes in thickness of the uncertainty tail. When 
organization resilience is increased, such as by strengthening the safety culture, the uncertainty tail 
becomes progressively thinner and low frequency-high consequence events become less likely. 
The KUUUB model uncertainty tail can therefore be considered a high-level indicator for the 
viability of the socio-technical organization.  
4. Practical measures to validate risk assessment, and to increase confidence 
A first possible practical measure is validation of models. Initiated in Europe, 2015, the 
project SAPHEDRA aims to evaluate and validate consequence models to be used in risk 
assessment. For an overview of projects and partners, see SAPHEDRA [28]. Meanwhile, the 
number of work packages of example applications has been increased to seven. Model evaluation 
protocols for consequence models should follow an established structure of pre-evaluation tasks, 
scientific assessment, user-oriented assessment, verification (checking computer implementation 
of the model), validation (comparison with experimental results), sensitivity and uncertainty 
analysis, and post evaluation tasks. A first result regarding gas/vapor dispersion models was 
published in SAPHEDRA HSE [29]. The investigation has reviewed various existing protocols 
and written recommendations for the structure of a future protocol. 
A second effort would be to follow-up the maturity model developed in 2014 by Rae et al. 
[30]. These authors consider Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) to be an engineering method, 
which means QRA must be evaluated by scientific methods that include being judged on its 
usefulness and cost effectiveness. For being true the latter demands that an expensive, elaborate, 
time-consuming QRA shall lead to safer systems with fewer and less costly upsets. This can be 
turned around: if QRA could be trusted, the safety of a system can be judged. The aim of 
developing the maturity model is to have guidance to discern an acceptably good QRA from a bad 
QRA. To make the distinction Rae et al. [30] analyzed a large variety of possible flaws in a QRA. 
They classified QRA flaws in four levels, followed by a further extensive breakdown of numbered 
flaws in tables and discussed in special sections. The content of the tables will be briefly 
summarized here: 
Level 1 - Unrepeatable: the record/report/description/documentation is incomplete, and it is not 
possible to reconstruct the assessment. This appears as failure to describe adequately source 
material, uncertainties, scope, and objectives/evaluation criteria, methods applied, while 
conclusions and recommendations are ambiguous, incomplete, and when required, are not 
quantified. 
Level 2 - Invalid: the effects of flaws in the assessment are larger than the underlying uncertainties 
in the events investigated, hence “the noise is larger than the signal”. This flaw is with respect 
to the source data and assumptions. Data can be flawed or available data are not used. In 
identifying scenarios, external effects, human, organizational, and software failures are not 
considered. This holds too for non-normal operations, while causal pathways analyzed are 
incomplete. Further, there is mismatch between assessment and reality, e.g., by wrong 
assumptions, incorrect application of models and data, and lack of internal consistency of 
assumptions and models. Then, in the evaluation of results acceptance criteria, such as ALARP, 
are not correctly applied, costs are not correctly calculated, and alternatives are not considered. 
Conclusions can be misleading and limitations and uncertainties are not reported. Overall, the 
analysis is not well conducted: stakeholders and experts may not have been consulted, results 
may be unrealistic or even worked to an acceptable result, there was no peer review, and the 
analysis was performed on the wrong issue. 
Level 3 – Valid but inaccurate: Rigor in selecting data is insufficient: available generic and specific 
data of better quality have not been used, selection and rejection rules/considerations have not 
been described; historical data were used without scrutiny of applicability, human and software 
errors estimates were wrongly determined, expert elicitation was not according strict procedure. 
Next, are various kinds of errors in applying the models, the use of probabilistics, and 
performing the calculations. Uncertainties have been given insufficient attention, uncertainties 
have been inadequately characterized or were not well expressed. Conclusions and 
recommendations are inadequately discussed in view of context, assumptions, model, and data 
limitations. 
Level 4 – Accurate but challengeable: A risk assessment to be tested is in the first place with 
respect to disputable data sources, their selection, relative weights, extrapolation, and 
interpretation. To be insufficient in scientific knowledge on a large variety of aspects, such as 
assumptions, failure/damage mechanisms, uncertainties of observations, and lacking in scope 
of existing studies compared to what is needed. 
Exceeding level 4 one would achieve an ideal assessment. The maturity model was tested by 
the authors for completeness by searching literature on errors in risk assessments, further by 
checking nine peer reviews from different sources involving very different risks, and by their own 
experience. Realism was tested by making an inventory of the flaws identified in the peer reviews 
demonstrating that each flaw occurs. Appropriateness was verified by investigating that flaws at 
level 1 will effectuate that checking flaws at level 2 does not make sense anymore, etc. At the 
higher levels, an experienced analyst can still make use of the results in a limited way. The maturity 
models can be used also as a roadmap for research on improvement. 
 
Figure 4. Lathrop and Ezell [31] representation of activities in the three domains of risk 
analysts, their professional community and the risk assessment users. The highlighting of the 
boxes of Culture of Analyst Quality and Third-Party Review is by the present authors, because 
these elements are considered as most essential in the whole process. 
 
Figure 5. The risk assessment and decision-making process according to the International 
Risk Governance Council (IRGC, 2005 [32]) with at the right-hand side the risk appraisal part 
starting with the analysis and separately at the left-hand side the management/decision-making 
part, but all connected through communication.  
As a third practical measure once a study is finished, the risk assessment (RA) report should 
be scrutinized and commented by an independent expert organization for a peer review, and given 
a second opinion on recommendations. Recently, Lathrop and Ezell [31] made a strong plea for 
such a step and presented a flow scheme of the assessment process, as shown in Figure 4. They 
also proposed tests for the various elements and described possible shortfalls. On a detail level, 
the above maturity model of Rae et al. [30] can serve as guidance to locate flaws. However, as we 
can learn from the experiences with the ‘safety case’ result assurances described in Section 2, 
nothing can be guaranteed; it is only that credibility can be increased.  
As a final measure, the recommendations of the International Risk Governance Council 
(IRGC) [31] for the assessment and decision-making process of high-risk projects should be 
remembered and applied, see Figure 5. These require from the start good communication among 
all stakeholders, and within a Risk Governance program just as Lathrop and Ezell [31] based on 
their experience recommend, strict separation of the analyst from the decision maker to reduce 
bias and encourage deliberation of all relevant information. 
Based on all of the above it is clear that conducting a risk assessment study by itself is only 
half the work, determining confidence limits and building trustworthiness cost at least the same 
amount of effort.  
5. Conclusions 
a. Study results of assessing high consequence-low probability risk of process plant 
installations containing hazardous materials quantitatively suffers commonly from large 
uncertainties that are not generally being modeled and managed. 
b. Trustworthiness and appropriateness arguments can be developed according to the 
approach shown for ‘safety cases’ following the Goal Structuring Notation and evidential 
reasoning method as proposed by Nair et al. [6], although this approach cannot result in an 
absolute guarantee.  
c. Several methods are available to derive failure probabilities given a certain amount of 
evidence. Based on precursor frequency evidence and an event tree, Bayesian methods may 
produce the best estimates of rare event frequencies. A spectrum of alternative methods is 
available to tackle in particular epistemic uncertainty for deep uncertainty cases in which 
knowledge exists. 
d. A few practical measures are summarized to obtain more confidence in risk assessment 
results: For consequence models work is being continued to develop an evaluation 
protocol. According to the work of Rae et al. [30], the RA maturity model gives guidance 
on what kind of flaws can be found in a risk assessment. Further, a peer review can support 
confidence in a RA, while another measure to reduce confirmation bias is to separate 
analyst and decision maker. 
e. Performing a risk assessment is only half the work; determining limits of confidence and 
building trustworthiness arguments is the other half. However, result reliability of a QRA 
is never 1, and the actual value of the reliability in fact unknown, even in case confidence 
limits are provided. Yet, a risk assessment is worthwhile to identify the physical possibility 
of an event with large undesirable consequence, so that decision can be made and 
communicated whether the risk needs to be reduced and how this can be done best. 
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APPENDIX 
Comparison of a conventional frequentist and the Bayesian statistical methods to 
determine failure frequency of, e.g., a pump based on scarce evidence 
Frequentist statistics:  
Suppose a stand-by pump fails 𝑡 = 2 times out of 𝑛 = 10 activations, hence by relative 
frequency of occurrence, mean failure chance estimator ?̂? = 2/10 = 0.2. Assuming binomial failure 
behavior the 𝐹-cumulative distribution function 𝑝𝑙 = {1 + (𝑛 − 𝑡 + 1) 𝑡
−1𝐹1−𝛼/2 [2𝑛 − 2𝑡 +
2; 2𝑡]}−1 and 𝑝𝑢 = {1 + (𝑛 − 𝑡){(𝑡 + 1)𝐹1−𝛼/2 [2𝑡 + 2; 2𝑛 − 2𝑡]}
−1}−1 , can be applied to calculate 
the lower and upper probability values with 1−𝛼 is interval of, e.g., 90% and 𝐹[𝑓1; 𝑓2] being the 
cumulative 𝐹-distribution with degrees of freedom 𝑓1 nominator, and 𝑓2 denominator, see e.g., 
Modarres et al. [33]. This way the 90% confidence failure limits are found as Pr(0.037 ≤ 0.2 ≤ 
0.51) = 0.9. 
With more observations, the epistemic uncertainty will be reduced and the confidence interval 
will narrow down. 
The Bayesian approach makes use of all information available; subjective or just an estimate, 
and this background knowledge is applied as a prior distribution ℎ(𝑥). However, as in this case 
this knowledge is blank, so ℎ(𝑥) is represented uninformatively by a uniform prior (0, 1) 
distribution, which is equal to a beta(,  ) -distribution with  =  = 1 and mean = /( + ) = 
½. A beta-distribution is a continuous distribution of the probability of a component being intact 
or failed, while it is also conjugate to a binomial distribution. The observed data, 𝑡 = 2 failures out 
of 𝑛 = 10 activations, is a binomial likelihood function 𝑙(𝑡|𝑥).  
The Bayes theorem, which in principle is just 𝑃(𝐴|𝐵)  =  𝑃(𝐵|𝐴) · 𝑃(𝐴)/𝑃(𝐵), with a 







Leaving out the constants in the distribution equations, the nominator in the above equation 
can be written as proportional to: 
 𝑥𝑡(1 − 𝑥)𝑛−𝑡𝑥−1(1 − 𝑥)−1 =   𝑥𝑡+−1(1 − 𝑥)𝑛−𝑡+−1. 
The terms at the right side of the equation represent the posterior beta-distribution. In that 
case, applying the equation for the mean of a beta distribution, the point Bayesian estimate is: 
𝑝𝐵 = (𝑡 + )/(𝑡 +  + 𝑛 − 𝑡 + ) , or with  and  = 1, it is (2+1)/(1+10+1) = 0.25. The 
90% Bayesian credible interval can now be calculated making use of the cumulative beta-
distribution as: Pr(𝑝 < 𝑝𝑙) = 𝐼𝑝𝑙(𝑡 + 1, 𝑛 − 𝑡 + 1) =
𝛼
2
 and Pr(𝑝 > 𝑝𝑢) = 𝐼𝑝𝑢(𝑡 + 1, 𝑛 − 𝑡 +
1) = 1 −
𝛼
2
 , in which  𝐼 is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the beta distribution that 
can be calculated easily using MS Excel. This results in Pr(0.078  0.25  0.47) = 0.9, which is 
narrower but still close to the frequentist confidence interval.  
However, if we have background information, e.g., about similar pumps, but another brand, 
or from the same brand but a different population not allowed to include in the classical statistics, 
this can be used in the Bayesian approach. Suppose in this group 15 failed out-of-100. Assume 
now again a beta-distribution prior, then with a binomial likelihood function 𝑝𝐵 = 
(2+15+1)/(1+10+100+1) = 0.16; and the 90% credible interval  is Pr(0.10  0.16  0.21) = 0.9. 
This range is much narrower than the ones before and lies within the limits found previously. 
 
